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GOOGLE V. COMMISSIONER: A COMPARISON OF
EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
Travis Clark
I. INTRODUCTION
Look down at your phone. Unlock the home screen. What applications
do you see? If you have an iPhone, you probably see iCalendar, Safari, and
the App Store. If you have a Windows Phone, you probably see Microsoft
Outlook, Internet Explorer, and the Windows App Store. If you have an
Android Phone, you probably see Google Search, Chrome Browser, and
Google Play. Are you satisfied with what you see? Do you feel like your
choice of smartphone applications (“apps”) is severely limited? Do you feel
like you have been denied access from an innovative mobile phone operating
system? Or, are you glad that when you turned on your new smartphone,
several apps were waiting for you and there was an app store where you
could download more? Imagine turning on your new smartphone and the
only features available were text messaging, phone calls, and a working
clock. Without the Google Play Store or the App Store, would you know
where to begin?
In 2007, Google launched its free open-source operating
systemAndroid.1 The HTC Dream, introduced in 2008, was the first
mobile device available with Google’s Android operating system
(“Android” or “Android OS”).2 With Android OS and a new line of multitouch interface smartphones, Google set forth to compete directly with Apple
iOS and the iPhone. By 2012, Android dominated the smartphone market
worldwide3that dominance continues to this day, and the European
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1
Kent Walker, Android: Choice at every turn, GOOGLE BLOG: GOOGLE IN EUR. (Nov.
10, 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/android-choice-competition-responseeurope/.
2
Jacqui Cheng, T-Mobile, Google Finally Unveil the First Android Phone,
ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 23, 2008, 10:56 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2008/09/tmobile-google-finally-unveil-the-first-android-phone/.
3
Anick Jesdanun, Android dominates smartphone market, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2012,
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Commission (“the Commission”) has taken notice.4 In April 2015, the
Commission initiated a formal investigation into Google’s licensing practice
of Android and its proprietary mobile apps.5 A year later, the Commission
sent Google an official Statement of Objections (SO) announcing its
“preliminary view that Google has implemented a strategy on mobile devices
to preserve and strengthen its dominance in general internet search.”6 In
November 2016, Google responded to the Commission’s SO stating that its
Android open-source platform has generated innovation, promoted
competition, and lowered prices throughout the European market.7
This Comment examines the Commission’s antitrust case against
Google. Essentially, the Commission alleges that Google abused its
dominant position in various markets by conditioning the pre-installation of
its proprietary apps on the exclusive use of its Android OS.8 In both the
European Union (E.U.) and the United States (U.S.), dominant companies
face antitrust scrutiny when they abuse their market position by “tying”
separate products together. This Comment compares the E.U. and U.S.
treatment of tying claims, specifically focusing on Google’s tying of its
Android OS to its suite of mobile apps (“Google Mobile Suite” or “GMS”).
Part II provides a brief background on E.U. and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence
and introduces the economics of tying arrangements. Part III compares the
two tying cases brought against Microsoft in the E.U. and U.S., and
highlights the differences between the two jurisdictions’ antitrust
jurisprudence. Part IV provides the background for the Commission’s case
against Google and analyzes potential issues the Commission faces under the
Microsoft framework.9 Part V briefly concludes with the proposition that the
Commission’s case against Google does more to harm consumers, than to
protect competition in the smartphone market.

3:06 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-08-08/android-worldwidesmartphone-market/56876294/1.
4
See European Commission Press Release IP/16/1492, Antitrust: Commission Sends
Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applications (Apr. 20,
2016) [hereinafter Statement of Objections].
5
See id.
6
Id.
7
Walker, supra note 1.
8
Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
9
See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619.
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE AND TYING
ARRANGEMENTS
A. Antitrust Laws in the United States
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) are responsible for prosecuting violations of the U.S.
antitrust laws.10 However, private parties may also bring antitrust claims
against other private parties.11 Tying arrangements can be challenged under
four federal provisions: (1) section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
agreements “in restraint of trade,”12 (2) section 2 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits monopolization,13 (3) section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
exclusive arrangements that may “substantially lessen competition,”14 and
(4) section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of
competition.”15 The Sherman Act applies to tied goods and services, while
the Clayton Act only applies to the tying of goods.16 This Comment mainly
focuses on the tying analysis under the Sherman Act, but because courts
often rely on tying precedent from claims brought under different statutory
provisions, it should be noted that the standards for analyzing tying
arrangements produce similar results under all the applicable provisions.17
B. Antitrust Laws in the European Union
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the
main source of E.U. antitrust law.18 Article 101, the equivalent of section 1
of the Sherman Act, prohibits “all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market.”19 In regard to tying arrangements, Article 101 prohibits
10
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1995), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-enforcement-guidelines-intern
ational-operations.
11
FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
12
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
13
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
14
15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
15
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
16
James F. Ponsoldt & Christopher D. David, A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U.
Antitrust Treatment of Tying Claims Against Microsoft: When Should the Bundling of
Computer Software be Permitted?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 421, 425 (2007).
17
Id.
18
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
19
Id. art. 101(1).
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anticompetitive agreements that “make the conclusion of contracts subject
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.”20 However, these provisions may be overcome in
the case of any agreement or practice:
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which
does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.21
Article 102 parallels section 2 of the Sherman Act, and prohibits any
abuse by “undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or
in a substantial part of it . . . so far as it may affect trade between Member
States.”22 In regard to tying arrangements, Article 102 states that an abuse
may occur in “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.”23 In contrast to Article 101, which prohibits anticompetitive
tying absent a showing of market power, Article 102 prohibits tying by a
dominant undertaking absent any actual anticompetitive effect.24 This
Comment follows the Commission’s allegations against Google by focusing
on tying arrangements analyzed under Article 102.
Regulation 1/2003 (the “Antitrust Regulation”) provides the
Commission with the investigative powers to enforce Article 102.25 An
Article 102 investigation can be initiated either by the Commission itself, or
upon receipt of a complaint from a competitor, Member State, or
individual.26 The first step for the Commission is to determine whether the
undertaking concerned is dominant within the relevant market.27 This
requires the Commission to define the relevant product and geographic
20

Id. art. 101(1)(e).
Id. art. 101(3)(a)(b).
22
Id. art. 102.
23
Id. art. 102(d).
24
See Ponsoldt & David, supra note 16, at 441 (Articles 81 and 82 are now Articles 101
and 102, respectively).
25
Council Regulation 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules of Competition,
2002 O.J. L 1/3 [hereinafter Antitrust Regulation].
26
Id. art. 17, at 13.
27
Competition: Antitrust procedures in abuse of dominance, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html (last updated Aug. 16,
2013).
21
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markets.28 The product market is “made of all products/services which the
consumer considers to be a substitute for each other due to their
characteristics, their price and their intended use.”29 The geographic market
is “an area in which the conditions of competition for a given product are
homogenous.”30 The Commission commonly relies on a firm’s market share
to determine whether the concerned firm is dominanta market share over
forty percent is a preliminary indication of dominance.31 Although the
Commission may determine the firm holds a dominant position in the
relevant market, a position of dominance is not illegal by itself.32 Rather, the
Commission must determine whether the firm has “abused” its dominant
position.33
Notably, the Commission takes the view that “a dominant company has
a special responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not distort
competition.”34 This heightened responsibility precludes dominant firms
from behavior such as, “requiring that buyers purchase all units of a
particular product only from the dominant company (exclusive purchasing);
setting prices at a loss-making level (predation); refusing to supply input
indispensable for competition in an ancillary market; [and] charging
excessive prices.”35
After an investigation, the Commission may issue a statement of
objections (SO), which informs the undertaking of the Commission’s
concerns with the conduct at issue.36 A company is entitled to access any
non-confidential files from the investigation and reply to the SO in writing.37
The company may also request an oral hearing in front of an independent
hearing officer.38 After examining the company’s response, the Commission
can choose to move forward with all or part of its initial objections and close
the case.39 Article 7 of the Antitrust Regulation permits the Commission to
draft a decision prohibiting the identified violations.40 The Advisory
Committee, composed of the Member States’ competition representatives,
then provides a final check of the Commission’s decision and can submit it
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Antitrust Regulation, supra note 25, art. 27, at 19.
See id.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 27.
Antitrust Regulation, supra note 25, art. 7, at 9.
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to the College of Commissioners to be formally adopted.41 Under the
Antitrust Regulation, the Commission can impose finesup to ten percent
of a firm’s annual revenueon an undertaking found in violation of Article
102.42 Companies maintain the right to appeal the decision to the General
Court of the European Union (GC), which can increase, reduce, or cancel the
fine imposed by the Commission.43 Ultimately, the Commission and/or the
defendant-firm can appeal the GC’s ruling to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU).44
C. Tying Arrangements and I-Scream
Tying generally involves a firm conditioning the sale of one product
(the tying good) on the sale of another product (the tied good).45 For
example, Jay makes homemade ice cream and sells it in tubs to local ice
cream parlors. Recognizing that every good scoop of ice cream deserves a
fresh waffle cone, Jay begins to insist that anyone wishing to sell his ice
cream also sell his waffle cones. That would be a tying arrangement in which
ice cream is the tying good and waffle cones are the tied good.
Bundling is a similar practice in which a firm offers several products in
a package deal. Pure bundling occurs where the firm only offers the products
together and not separatelye.g., surgery with anesthesia.46 Mixed
bundling occurs where the firm sells the various products both packaged
together and separately, but extremely discounts the packaged pricee.g.,
shampoo and conditioner.47
Tying and bundling practices raise anticompetitive concerns when a
firm can leverage its monopoly power in market A into market B.48 Imagine
if Jay’s next door neighbor, Timmy, was a waffle cone competitor who sells
his cones to the local parlor, I-Scream. But I-Scream wishes to sell Jay’s ice
cream because demand for it is so high. Jay, realizing he has significant
power in the homemade ice cream market, requires I-Scream and other
dealers purchasing his ice cream to exclusively sell his waffle cones. If IScream does not exclusively sell Jay’s waffle cones, then Jay will not
provide I-Scream with his highly-demanded ice cream. Consequently, IScream is not in an economically reasonable position to purchase and sell
41
42
43
44
45

Id. art. 14, at 11.
Id. art. 23, at 17.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 27.
See id.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 198

(2005).

46
JURIAN LANGER, TYING AND BUNDLING
COMPETITION LAW 4 (2007).
47
Id.
48
HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 201.

AS A

LEVERAGING CONCERN UNDER EC
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Timmy’s waffle cones. Not only is Timmy hurt as a waffle cone competitor,
but consumers may also be negatively affected by the elimination of
substitute waffle cones.
The main concern is that tying or bundling certain products “prevents
goods from competing directly for consumer choice on their merits, i.e.,
being selected as a result of ‘buyers’ independent judgment.”49 In the
example, I-Scream’s freedom to select the best bargain in the waffle cone
market is impaired by its desire to buy Jay’s homemade ice-cream. In
addition, I-Scream’s ability to evaluate the true cost of either product is
foggedeven if Timmy’s waffle cones are of better quality or cheaper, IScream will be unwilling to forego Jay’s highly demanded ice-cream in order
to purchase Timmy’s cones. Accordingly, direct competition between Jay
and Timmy’s waffle cones is foreclosed because I-Scream is forced to buy
Jay’s waffle cones by simply buying Jay’s homemade ice-cream.
Nevertheless, selling products together can generate efficiencies.50 For
example, cost savings can appear in the consumption and/or the production
sides.51 When consumers would buy both products A and B separately, and
the product valuations are positively correlated, the cost savings from selling
the products together creates an incentive for a firm to bundle the goods.52
The ability for consumers to purchase complementary products from the
same supplier is a consumption efficiencysearch costs are reduced where
an efficient firm can bundle the most consumer satisfying combination of
products.53 Bundling may also reduce a supplier’s production and
distribution costs.54 Moreover, “bundling may assure product quality by
neutralizing: (1) the confusion externality regarding the source of poor
performance, and (2) the cost-sharing externality when consumers
knowingly use inferior products with the bundling good.”55 Essentially, the
efficiency gains associated with tying and bundling certain products may
ultimately benefit consumers, and thus competition.
III. THE MICROSOFT SAGA
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that Microsoft’s bundling of Windows PC operating system (“Windows
OS”) and Internet Explorer was not a per se antitrust violation for attempted
49
United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 (1984)).
50
LANGER, supra note 46, at 24.
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
Id. at 8.
54
Id. at 89.
55
Id. at 9.
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monopolization of the internet browser market.56 The court remanded the
issue to the lower court with instructions to analyze the tying arrangement
under a “rule of reason” standard.57 Consequently, the DOJ decided not to
pursue the issue any further, and Microsoft continued to bundle its
products.58 In contrast, in 2007, the European Union General Court affirmed
the Commission’s finding that Microsoft abused its dominant position by
bundling Windows OS with Windows Media Player (WMP).59 The
Commission required Microsoft to offer a version of Windows OS without
WMP in addition to the bundled version.60 Although the allegations and the
judicial tests set forth in both cases had many similarities, the courts reached
contrasting resolutions.61 Nevertheless, both the U.S. and E.U. Microsoft
cases significantly impacted their respective antitrust tying jurisprudence.
The E.U. and U.S. judicial tests for tying practices follow similar steps.
Tying is anticompetitiveand therefore a violation of antitrust lawsif (1)
the tying and tied products are two separate products; (2) the undertaking
concerned is dominant in the market for the tying product; (3) the practice
does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied
product (coercion); and (4) the practice in question forecloses competition.62
In the E.U., the Commission also examines the objective justifications
advanced by the defendanthowever, E.U. courts generally accept the
Commission’s examination and refrain from further analysis.63 In the U.S.,
courts apply a “rule of reason” standard, which weighs a defendant’s
procompetitive justifications against the anticompetitive effects of the
questioned practice.64 The following section compares and contrasts the
jurisdictional approaches to this “cohesive” test through the lens of the
Microsoft cases.65 For purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that Google
is dominant in every relevant market. Thus, the second step of the
testdetermining whether the undertaking is dominant in the
marketplacewill not be discussed.

56

United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id.
58
Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling
in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 483, 48384 (2009).
59
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491.
60
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 484.
61
See id.
62
United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491.
63
See Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491.
64
See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 9495.
65
See id.; Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491.
57
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A. Separate Products Test
The separate products test is the first step in analyzing tying
arrangements in the E.U. and U.S. The central question is whether the tied
or bundled goods are separate products or a single product. The separate
products test serves as a screening device to exclude from antitrust scrutiny
practices with obvious efficiency gains that benefit consumers.66 Two items
may be considered a single product when they enjoy certain economies of
joint production and distribution that can only be achieved by offering them
as a package.67 The separate products test can be analyzed from a demandside and a supply-side perspective.68 While the separate products test in the
U.S. recognizes the presence of efficiency gains, the separate products test
in the E.U. functions as a proxy for anticompetitive effects.69
In the U.S., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the
Supreme Court’s tying precedents, which relied on the separate products test
as a screening mechanism for determining whether a tying arrangement was
per se unlawful.70 The court stated that the rationale behind the separate
products test was “a rough proxy for whether a tying arrangement may, on
balance, be welfare-enhancing, and unsuited to per se condemnation.”71
Essentially, the court determined that the separate products test was
“backward-looking” and failed to appreciate the net efficiencies of welfareenhancing innovation.72 Accordingly, the court held that software bundles
needed to be analyzed under a rule of reason standard that weighs any
anticompetitive effects against the efficiency gains that may benefit
consumers.73 Thus, the court remanded the case to the lower court, but the
DOJ ultimately opted out of further litigating the issue.74
In the E.U., under Article 102, “products are distinct if, in the absence
of tying or bundling, from the customer’s perspective, the products are or
would be purchased separately.”75 The Commission and E.U. courts focus
the separate products inquiry on both the consumer demand and the supplyoriented character of the separate products test.76 However, E.U.
66

See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 519.
Id. at 51920.
68
See J. Gregory Sidak, Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
619, 680 (2015).
69
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 52325.
70
See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 8485.
71
Id. at 87.
72
Id. at 89.
73
Id. at 95.
74
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 48384.
75
Id. at 520; see also Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, [2004],
O.J. L 32/33, ¶ 803.
76
See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 52122.
67
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jurisprudence arguably has shifted from a more demand-oriented test to a
supply-side analysis focused on protecting non-dominant competitors in the
tied product market.77
From the consumer demand perspective, evidence of separate products
includes: consumers purchasing products separately when given a choice,
and firms tending to tie the products together in a competitive market.78 In
Microsoft, the court ruled that “the distinctness of products . . . has to be
assessed with a view to consumer demand,” and “in the absence of
independent demand for the allegedly tied product, there can be no question
of separate products and no abusive tying.”79 Microsoft argued that its WMP
combined with its Windows PC operating system formed a single, integral
product, because customers wanted to purchase the products together.80 The
court rejected Microsoft’s argument because “the fact that the market
provides media players separately is evidence for separate consumer demand
for media players, distinguishable from the demand for client PC operating
systems.”81
Significantly, the court’s analysis focused more on the supply-side,
examining the existence of competing suppliers in the alleged tied product
market to determine whether WMP and Windows PC operating system were
distinct products.82 The court stressed that with complementary products
like the Windows PC operating system and application software, “it is quite
possible that customers will wish to obtain the products together, but from
different sources.”83 Relying on previous CJEU case law, the court noted
the presence of “independent companies specializing in the manufacture and
sale of the tied product constitutes serious evidence of the existence of a
separate market for that product.”84 Thus, the fact that consumers had
acquired media players separately from operating systems before and after
Microsoft’s introduction of WMP demonstrated that consumers regarded the
products as separate.85
The court’s supply oriented approach makes sense when viewing the
separate products test in conjunction with the court’s interpretation of the
foreclosure of competition.86 The presence in the tied market of specialized
companies indicates that there is an independent demand for the tied product
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

See id. at 522.
Id. at 520.
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶¶ 91718.
Id. ¶ 912.
Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, ¶¶ 80304.
Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 932.
Id. ¶ 922.
Id. ¶ 927 (internal citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 932.
See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 522.
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without the tying product. If competitors cannot profitably operate in the
tied product market due to the dominant undertaking’s practice, then
competition is foreclosed. The court’s supply-side analysis echoes the E.U.
concern with the exclusion of rival suppliers, which constitutes a main point
of divergence between E.U. and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence.87
B. Coercion
The second step in analyzing tying arrangements is determining
whether the tying of two distinct products precludes consumers from
choosing to obtain the tying product without the tied product. According to
Herbert Hovenkamp:
coercion should result from (1) an absolute refusal to sell the tying
product without the tied product; (2) a discount, rebate or other
financial incentive given to buyers who also take the tied product;
[or] (3) technological design that makes it impossible to sell the
tying product without the tied product.88
The coercion test is designed to distinguish between the various forms
of tying arrangementscontractual, technological integration, or financial
incentivesand how they affect consumers.89 In both the E.U. and the U.S.,
slightly different standards may apply to each form of tying.90 Accordingly,
the E.U. and the U.S. arguably diverge in their analysis of coercion.
However, for purposes of this Comment, the potential differences in the
standards applied to each form are inconsequential. Thus, this section
primarily focuses on the E.U. interpretation of the coercion test.
A tying arrangement violates E.U. antitrust law if the dominant
undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product
without the tied product.91 Coercion may result from a dominant undertaking
refusing to sell one product without the other through a contractual clause, a
dominant undertaking pressuring the customer to take both products through
financial incentive or favorable treatment, or a consumer’s inability to
technically remove one product from the other.92 In Microsoft, the court
stated that the coercion test is “merely expressing in different words the
concept that bundling assumes that consumers are compelled, directly or
indirectly, to accept ‘supplementary obligations,’ such as those referred to in
Article [102(d)] EC.”93
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See id.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 306, 410 (3d ed. 2005).
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 52829.
See id. at 52932.
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶¶ 86064.
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 529.
Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 864. The court also noted the Commission
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In Microsoft, the court held that Microsoft had contractually and
technically coerced its customers (i.e., the manufacturers), which then passed
on to the end consumers.94 The court found that Microsoft’s licensing system
made it impossible for manufacturers to obtain a license from Microsoft to
install a Windows OS without WMP.95 Microsoft argued that the integration
of WMP with the Windows OS did not amount to coercion because
customers (1) received WMP free of charge; (2) were not obligated to use
WMP; and (3) could install and use competing media players.96 The court
rejected each of Microsoft’s arguments in turn. First, the court found that
WMP was not provided free of charge, but rather, its cost was included in
the total price of the Windows OS.97 Second, the court stated that “neither
Article [102(d)] nor the case law on bundling requires that consumers must
be forced to use the tied product or prevented from using the same product
supplied by a competitor of the dominant undertaking.”98 Third, although
manufacturers could install competing media players, the court found that
they could not technically uninstall WMP.99 Thus, manufacturers were
deterred from pre-installing other media players, which incentivized end
consumers to use WMP notwithstanding the potentially “higher quality”
media players offered by competitors.100
E.U. antitrust law emphasizes consumer sovereignty, rather than the
concept of consumer welfare.101 The E.U. takes the position that consumer
sovereignty is preserved when the consumers can influence price, quality,
and ultimately the innovative process according to their own preferences.102
The Microsoft court’s focus on a competitor’s ability to compete for the preinstallation of media players, and its disregard for the consumers’ ability to
install alternative media players, implies a strict standard that seems to
contradict the E.U.’s goal of preserving consumer sovereignty. On the one
hand, Microsoft restricted the manufacturers’ choice of which media player
it pre-installed on Windows OS. Theoretically, the Commission was
concerned that Microsoft would not respond to consumer preferences if it
could coerce the intermediaries to deny its media player competitors.
appropriately relied on Article 102(d) in its entirety because its list of supplementary
obligations is not exhaustive. See id. ¶ 861.
94
Id. ¶ 96365.
95
Id.
96
Id. ¶ 960.
97
Id. ¶ 968; but see Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 529 (“This argument seems
paradoxical because the court had already accepted that the two products were distinct, and it
should have therefore examined Microsoft’s arguments from that perspective.”).
98
Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 970.
99
Id. ¶ 971.
100
Id.
101
See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 542–43.
102
See id. at 543.
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However, many legitimate commercial practices have the same exclusionary
effect of hindering a rival’s ability to compete.103 In the absence of a clear,
ex ante, identification of whether a practice is illegal, companies become
discouraged from introducing their innovative products to the market free of
charge.104 A strict standard that does not consider the end consumer’s ability
to obtain alternative products fails to recognize the efficiency gainssuch
as lower costs and higher quality inputsthat may outweigh any
anticompetitive effects by allowing consumers to access the competitive
market with little-to-no cost. Thus, E.U. courts should allocate weight to the
efficiency gains passed on to end consumers to ensure that tying
arrangements that could enhance consumer sovereignty are not cursorily
deemed unlawful.
C. Foreclosure of Competition
The final step105 in analyzing tying arrangements is determining
whether the tying of two distinct products forecloses competition in the
relevant market. The central question is whether the practice has an overall
anticompetitive effect on competition. However, the E.U. and U.S.
approaches to determining the anticompetitive effects of a practice are far
from cohesive. The differences in the jurisdictional interpretations of
anticompetitive foreclosure illustrate the distinct theoretical foundations of
E.U. and U.S. antitrust law. There are three key points of divergence: (1)
whether the foreclosure of competition requires something more than
excluding or hindering competitors; (2) whether the anticompetitive effect
should be presumed from the nature of the practice and the existence of a
dominant undertaking; and (3) who has the burden to prove that the practice
is either anticompetitive or procompetitive.106
On one hand, U.S. antitrust law is not concerned with protecting
competitors, but rather, competition.107 Accordingly, U.S. courts require
more than mere evidence of competitors being harmed.108 Thus, the
foreclosure of competition test, utilized in the U.S., weighs the
anticompetitive effects of a practice with its procompetitive benefitsand
103

See id. at 54446.
Id. at 545.
105
The final step can be broken down into multiple steps, such as (1) identifying the
anticompetitive effect; (2) examining the procompetitive effects or objective justifications
advanced by the defendant; and (3) determining whether the anticompetitive effects outweigh
the procompetitive effects. This analysis is known in United States jurisprudence as a “rule
of reason” standard. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d
34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
106
See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 534.
107
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
108
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 55253.
104
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ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.109
In contrast, E.U. antitrust law is concerned with protecting nondominant firms that compete in the tied product market.110 Consequently,
E.U. courts apply a quasi-per se test, which presumes the questioned practice
is anticompetitive if a dominant firm engages in conduct that restricts a
rival’s ability to compete.111 However, E.U. antitrust law (at least in the
context of technical tying) permits the dominant undertaking to advance
certain procompetitive effects to objectively justify its conductbut
ultimately, the defendant bears the burden of proof.112
In the E.U. Microsoft case, the Commission took an unprecedented
approachsimilar to the approach taken by the D.C. Court of Appealsand
examined the anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s bundling in light of its
efficiency justifications and incentives to foreclose.113 The Commission
stated:
[T]here are indeed circumstances relating to the tying of WMP
which warrant a closer examination of the effects that tying has
on competition in this case. While in classical tying cases, the
Commission and the Courts considered the foreclosure effect for
competing vendors to be demonstrated by the bundling of a
separate product with the dominant product, in the case at issue,
users can and do to a certain extent obtain third party media
players through the Internet, sometimes for free. There are
therefore indeed good reasons not to assume without further
analysis that tying WMP constitutes conduct which by its very
nature is liable to foreclosure of competition.114
The court accepted the Commission’s application of a structured rule
of reason standard, and then examined the issue of who bears the burden of
proof under the analysis:
[A]lthough the burden of proof of the existence of the
circumstances that constitute an infringement of Article [102] EC
is borne by the Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking
concerned, and not for the Commission, before the end of the
administrative procedure, to raise any plea of objective
justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. It then
falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of
an abuse of a dominant position, to show that the arguments and
109

Id. at 53536.
See id. at 54951.
111
Id. at 549.
112
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1144.
113
See Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, [2004], O.J. L 32/33, ¶¶
84041.
114
Id. ¶ 841 (emphasis in the original).
110

CLARK (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

7/27/2017 8:16 PM

COMMENT

1035

evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and,
accordingly, that the justification put forward cannot be
accepted.115
Microsoft argued its bundling produced efficiency gainsrelated to
distribution and the quality of its Windows Media Player contentthat
outweighed any of the identified anti-competitive effects.116 Microsoft
claimed the Commission ignored the benefits software developers and
Internet site creators received from the stable platform Microsoft created by
fully integrating its media functionality in Windows OS.117 Microsoft argued
that “remov[ing] [the] media functionality from the system consisting of
Windows and Windows Media Player would create a series of problems to
the detriment of consumers, software developers and Internet site
creators . . . [and] would result in the degrading and fragmentation of that
system.”118 However, the court, siding with the Commission, noted the issue
was not with Microsoft’s business model of bundling, but rather, the issue
was with Microsoft’s refusal to simultaneously offer “a version of [its]
system without Windows Media Player, thus permitting [manufacturers] or
end users wishing to do so to install the product of their choice on their client
PC as the first streaming media player.”119
The Court then rejected Microsoft’s “media functionality” argument,
stating:
[t]he fact that tying enables software developers and Internet site
creators to be sure that Windows Media Player is present on
virtually all client PCs in the world is precisely one of the main
reasons why the Commission correctly took the view that the
bundling led to the foreclosure of competing media players from
the market.”120
The court stressed the fact that manufacturers can satisfy the consumer
demand for an operating system that incorporates a streaming media player
without Microsoft’s exclusivity agreement.121 Accordingly, the advantages
operators received from any uniform presence did not offset the
anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s tying arrangement.122 Thus, the court
affirmed the Commission’s conclusion that Microsoft’s conduct resulted in
an unjustifiable foreclosure of competition.
Critically, the court did not identify any direct harm to consumersthis
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1144.
Id. ¶ 1091.
Id. ¶ 1146.
Id. ¶ 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. ¶ 1150.
Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1151.
See id. ¶¶ 115557.
Id. ¶ 1151.
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is where the E.U. and U.S. theoretical approaches drastically split.123 In
accordance with E.U. antitrust principles, the General Court inferred that
consumers were indirectly harmed by Microsoft’s competitive alteration of
the media player market.124 This stems from the E.U.’s inclination to protect
competitors as a way to strengthen consumer sovereignty in the long run.125
Conversely, the dominant U.S. approach requires proof of direct consumer
harmevidenced by increased prices or reduced output in the relevant
market.126 This stems from the U.S. preference to protect overall
competition without chilling innovation and reducing consumer-welfare.127
While it may seem that the E.U. approach to technological tying has
shifted towards affording antitrust defendants with a legitimate opportunity
to overcome the presumed foreclosure of competition, in practice, proving
the existence of objective justifications remains extremely difficult.128 The
low standard of proof required for anticompetitive harm, combined with the
fact that the Commission does not have to prove consumers have been
actually or directly harmed, makes this “structured rule of reason” standard
illusory. In contrast, the rule of reason standard announced in the U.S.
Microsoft case places a heightened burden of proof on plaintiffs, which
ultimately dissuaded the DOJ from proceeding further against Microsoft.129
Nevertheless, the E.U. Microsoft case illustrates that the Commission, and
therefore E.U. courts, may be willing to examine certain procompetitive
justifications for technological tying arrangements, which arguably do not
foreclose competition and instead enhance consumer-welfare. Enter Google.
IV. GOOGLE V. COMMISSIONER
A. Background
In 1996, two Stanford University PhD students, Larry Page and Sergey
Brin, developed an internet search engine named Google.130 Google is now
the largest search engine in the world.131 In 2005, Google acquired Android,
Inc., the start-up that initially developed the Android operating system to
123

Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 557–58.
Id.
125
See id. at 558.
126
Id.
127
See United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128
Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 551.
129
See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 95.
130
See Google Company History, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/about/ourstory (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
131
See Konrad Krawczyk, Google is Easily the Most Popular Search Engine, But Have
You Heard Who is in Second?, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 3, 2014, 11:34 AM), http://www.digital
trends.com/web/google-baidu-are-the-worlds-most-popular-search-engines/.
124
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coordinate the hardware and software functions of mobile devices.132 In
2008, Google entered the mobile device industry with its release of the first
Android-operated mobile devicethe HTC Dream.133 Android is Google’s
operating system (OS) for mobile devices.134 Android is an open-source
platform, which Google licenses free of charge to manufacturers of mobile
devices (“manufacturers” or “customers”), developers of mobile
applications, or any end user (“consumers”).135 Google also develops a
variety of mobile apps that allow consumers to manage their mobile
devices.136 Google’s most important app, Google Play, functions as a
storefront for users to download other Google apps, as well as third-party
appsthe vast majority of which are available for free.137 Google’s
proprietary appse.g., Google Play, Google Maps, Gmail, YouTube, and
Google Calendarcan be found on virtually all Android-operated mobile
devices.138 Google permits manufacturers to pre-install a suite of proprietary
appscalled Google Mobile Services (GMS)on their mobile devices.139
Manufacturers, such as Samsung, receive GMS for free if they accept the
conditions in Google’s Mobile Application Distribution Agreement
(MADA).140
Like many technology-based business models, Google operates in a
multisided market. A multisided market is a market “in which one or several
platforms enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two (or
multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side.”141 On one
side, Google’s market consists of smartphone and tablet owners who use
mobile apps; the other sides consist of advertisers, app developers, and
mobile device manufacturers.142 It is common practice for businesses
operating in a multisided market to charge different prices to the different
sides of the market.143 For example, while Google offers its apps for free to
consumers, it collects fees from advertisers.144 Google attracts users by
offering its apps for free.145 The more app users Google can attract, the more
132

See Cheng, supra note 2.
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.; see also Walker, supra note 1.
136
Sidak, supra note 68, at 621.
137
See id. at 65960.
138
See id.
139
Id. at 660.
140
See id. at 669.
141
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND
J. ECON. 645, 645 (2006).
142
Sidak, supra note 68, at 662.
143
See id.
144
See id. at 66264.
145
Id. at 663.
133
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revenue Google generates from its mobile advertising.146 Advertising
revenues then allow Google to recoup its investments in Android OS and
mobile apps.147 Thus, Google’s practice of offering Android, Google apps,
and GMS free of charge enables Google to attract consumers, develop
competitive products, and increase profits through mobile advertising.148
B. The Commission’s Statement of Objections and Google’s Response
On April 20, 2016, the European Commission (the “Commission”) sent
Google a Statement of Objections announcing its “preliminary view that
Google has implemented a strategy on mobile devices to preserve and
strengthen its dominance in general internet search.”149 In its Statement of
Objections, the Commission alleges: (1) that Google unlawfully tied its
Google Search and Google Chrome browser with its other proprietary apps,
namely the Google Play Store; and (2) that Google unlawfully tied its
Android OS to its proprietary apps, namely the Google Play Store and
Google Search.150 The Commission is concerned that Google’s practices:
(1) allow Google to abuse the dominant position of Google Search in general
internet search services; (2) “affect the ability of competing mobile browsers
to compete with Google Chrome;” and (3) “hinder the development of
operating systems based on the Android open source code and the
opportunities they would offer for the development of new apps and
services.”151 Moreover, the Commission asserts Google’s conduct harms
consumers by narrowing their choice of products and services, and stifling
competition in the market.152
The Commission also alleges that Google’s dominant position is
protected by certain barriers to entry and by the significant costsassociated
with losing their current apps, data, and contactsthat consumers, i.e.,
Android users, face if they wish to switch operating systems.153 For example,
in the market for Android app stores, Google’s “Play Store accounts for more
than 90% of apps downloaded on Android devices in the [European
Economic Area].”154 The Commission argues that Google’s dominance is
protected by the unavailability of downloadable app stores from the Play
Store and the fact that consumers generally would not switch to other app

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id.
Id. at 664.
Sidak, supra note 68, at 664.
Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Commission Fact Sheet, MEMO/16/1484 (Apr. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
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stores because they would have to purchase a new device and would face
significant switching costs.155
The Commission is concerned that “by reducing manufacturers’
incentives to pre-install competing browser apps and consumers’ incentives
to download those apps, competition in both mobile browsers and general
search has been adversely affected.”156 Accordingly, the Commission stated
that it “seeks to ensure that manufacturers are free to choose which apps they
pre-install on their devices.”157 The Commission is also concerned that the
anti-fragmentation agreements have denied consumers access to innovative
operating systems.158 In support, the Commission noted that Android is an
open-source system that is supposed to allow anyone to freely develop their
own modified mobile operating system.159 The Commission stated that
while “EU antitrust rules allow dominant companies to put in place
restrictions only when they are objectively justified . . . to date, Google has
not been able to show this in relation to the restrictions in the ‘AntiFragmentation Agreements.’”160 Apparently, “the Commission has evidence
that the exclusivity condition affected whether certain device manufacturers
and mobile network operators pre-installed competing search services.”161 If
the Commission’s charges are upheld, Google could face a fine of up to ten
percent of its annual turnover, which is close to $7.5 billion.162
C. Distinguishing Google’s Conduct from the Microsoft Case
There are three significant differences between Google’s alleged tying
arrangement and the bundling practice found unlawful in Microsoft. First,
there is a strong argument that Google’s mobile suite is a single product
offered for pre-installationrather than a bundle of distinct proprietary apps.
Second, Google offers all its productsthe Android OS and its proprietary
appsto customers free of charge. Third, Google offers its Android OS
without forcing customers to pre-install its apps. The following analysis
attempts to show how these unique factors raise substantial issues with the
Commission’s case under the General Court’s approach in Microsoft.

155

Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
Id.
157
Fact Sheet, supra note 154.
158
Id.
159
See id.
160
Id.
161
Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
162
Mark Scott, Parallels Between Europe’s Antitrust Cases Against Google and
Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/technology/
google-microsoft-europe-antitrust-android.html.
156
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i. Separate Products Test
Google offers a suite of its proprietary apps (“GMS”) that mobile
device manufactures can pre-install on Android-run devices.163 The issue is
whether GMS is a bundle of separate products or a single product. The
Commission views the apps, such as the Play Store and Google Search, as
separate products.164 But are these products separate? Google can, should,
and most likely will argue that the suite of apps offered for pre-installation
are not an aggregation of separate products, but rather a single product.
Certainly, there is an independent demand for each proprietary app.165
However, GMS represents an entirely new market in which companies
compete for manufacturers to pre-install their suite of mobile apps.166 From
a demand-side perspective, the Commission argues that if given the choice,
manufacturers generally would pre-install an app store, a search engine, and
a web browser separately.167 Yet, this ignores that manufacturers may prefer
to acquire and pre-install a mobile suite because obtaining each app
individually would significantly increase their search and transaction
costs.168
From a supply-side perspective, the Commission argues that rival
search engines and browsers are unable to become the default services
because Google Search and Chrome are tied to the Play Store.169 However,
unlike Microsoft’s bundling of its WMP and PC operating system where the
cost of WMP was included in the overall cost of manufacturers installing the
operating system, the cost of pre-installing Google Search and Chrome are
not reflected in the cost of licensing Google’s Play Storemanufacturers
acquire the complete GMS for free.170 Moreover, Google’s mobile suite
product does not compete with the suppliers of individual apps. Rather, it
competes with other companies that offer manufacturers a mobile suite of
apps for pre-installation, such as Yandex171 and Microsoft. If companies
offering mobile suites, like Google, are required to license their proprietary
163

Sidak, supra note 68, at 660.
See generally Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
165
For example, there is a demand for search engines separate from Internet browsers. A
consumer may use Google Search on her iPhone, but prefer to use Safari Browser to “surf”
the web.
166
Sidak, supra note 68, at 680.
167
See Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
168
See Sidak, supra note 68, at 680.
169
Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
170
See Walker, supra note 1.
171
See Sidak, supra note 68, at 680. Yandex is a Russian search and software company
that offers its own mobile app suite that can be pre-installed on Android operating mobile
devices and others. See Stephen Shankland, Yandex Suite of Android Tools Sidesteps Google,
CNET (Feb. 20, 2014, 4:14 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/yandex-suite-of-free-androidtools-sidesteps-google/.
164
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apps separately, then the market for mobile suites will no longer exist.
The argument that GMS is a single-product is ironically bolstered by
the Commission’s second allegation that Google unlawfully conditions the
pre-installation of its proprietary apps on manufacturers exclusively using
Google’s Android OS. Nevertheless, the Commission’s concern with
Google tying its Android OS (tied product) with the pre-installation of its
proprietary apps (tying product) is well supported by the separate product
test. Google’s “Anti-Fragmentation Agreements” require that manufacturers
agree to not sell modified Android operating systems (“Android forks”) if
they want to pre-install GMS.172 Under the separate products test, there is
no distinguishing factor between Google’s practice and Microsoft’s bundling
of its operating system with its media player. However, the separate products
test does not end the anticompetitive inquiry. Thus, the following discussion
will focus on Google’s bundling of Android OS and GMS.
ii. Coercion
The Commission alleges that manufacturers do not have a choice to
obtain GMS (tying product) without agreeing to use Android OS (tied
product).173 A tying arrangement violates EU antitrust law if the dominant
undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product
without the tied product.174 The issue is whether Google’s practice compels
consumers, directly or indirectly, to accept supplementary obligations that
affect consumer sovereignty.175
Factually, this is the opposite of the tying arrangement in Microsoft. In
Microsoft, the tying product was Windows OS and the tied product was
WMP.176 The Microsoft court was concerned with protecting the competing
media player suppliers in order to maintain consumer sovereignty.177
Essentially, consumer sovereignty was impaired because Microsoft’s
practice eliminated consumers’ ability to influence the price, quality, and
innovative process according to their own preferences.178 Here, the
Commission is concerned with protecting companies that compete to offer
Android forks.179 Specifically, the Commission asserts that Google’s
conduct “prevent[s] manufacturers from selling smart mobile devices based
on a competing Android fork which had the potential of becoming a credible
172

Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
Id.
174
See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶
86064; see also Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 529.
175
See Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 864.
176
See id at 887.
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Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 54243.
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Id. at 543.
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Statement of Objections, supra note 4.
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alternative to the Google Android operating system.”180
However, Google’s conduct ultimately does not hinder consumer
choice.181 Google offers both Android OS and GMS free of charge.182
Google does not require manufacturers to pre-install GMS in exchange for
its Android operating system“GMS and Android are not
interdependent.”183 For example, Amazon’s Fire smartphone and Nokia’s X
smartphone operate on the Android OS but do not come pre-installed with
GMS.184 Moreover, manufacturers and consumers can obtain Google Search
and Chrome on mobile devices that do not operate on Android OS.185
Although manufacturers cannot pre-install these apps, consumers ultimately
decide which search engines and browsers they want to use regardless of
what operating system they have. Unlike Microsoft’s WMPwhich was
impossible to uninstallan Android user is free to uninstall Google Search
and Chrome and replace them with alternative apps.186 Although the court
in Microsoft applied a strict coercion test to preserve consumer sovereignty
(or at least in theory), Google’s conduct does not affect the ability of
consumers to influence the price, quality, and innovative process according
to their preferences.
iii. Foreclosure of Competition
The most important issue in the Commission’s case against Google is
whether tying the Android OS to GMS forecloses competition in the market
for mobile phone operating systems. E.U. antitrust law is concerned with
protecting competitors because a dominant undertaking’s alteration to the
competitive structure indirectly harms consumers.187 In Microsoft, the
court’s main concern was with Microsoft’s refusal to offer an operating
system without WMP.188 This effectively foreclosed competition in the
media
player
market
because
manufacturersand
therefore
180

Id.
See Aleksandra Eriksson, Google rejects EU antitrust charges on Android,
EUOBSERVER (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:56 PM), https://euobserver.com/economic/135865 (quoting
Daniel Castro, the Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation,
“[t]he root of the problem with EU regulators’ complaints is that they are relying on outdated
economic theories. They do not seem to understand that innovation-based industries, like
mobile operating systems, operate differently than conventional industries.”).
182
See Walker, supra note 1; see also Sidak, supra note 68, at 65761.
183
Sidak, supra note 68, at 660.
184
Id. at 66061.
185
Id. at 659; see also Geoffrey Manne, The EU’s Antitrust Complaints Are Contrived,
WIRED (Nov. 20, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/eus-android-antitrustcomplaints-contrived/.
186
See Walker, supra note 1; see also Manne, supra note 185.
187
See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 557.
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Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1150.
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consumerscould not obtain Windows OS without pre-installing WMP.189
The Commission’s case against Google is lacking a comparable distortion of
the competitive structure.
The first issue is that the Commission ignores a significant portion of
Google’s competitors. Google competes with closed operating systems such
as Apple iOS and Windows Phone OS.190 In Google’s response to the
Statement of Objections, Google stated that “[t]o ignore competition with
Apple is to miss the defining feature of today’s competitive smartphone
landscape,” and cited to the Commission’s own market survey in which
eighty-nine percent of respondents confirmed that Apple and Android are
competitors.191 Unlike Android, Apple iOS is exclusively available on
Apple’s mobile devices.192 Windows Phone OS is also a closed operating
system.193 By ignoring competitors such as Apple and Microsoft in the
operating system market, and focusing solely on Android fork operating
systems, the Commission essentially favors closed-source over open-source
platforms.194
The second issue with the Commission’s narrow market approach is
that the competitors, i.e., suppliers of Android forks, are only able to develop
Android forks and compete with Android because Google created the opensource Android platform. Google can distribute Android OS and its
proprietary apps free of charge because it “lowers prices for phone makers
and consumers, while still letting [Google] sustain [its] substantial
investment in Android and [Google] Play.”195 The more app users Google
attracts, the more revenue Google generates from its mobile advertising.
Advertising revenues then allow Google to recoup its investments in
Android and mobile apps. Thus, Google’s practice of offering Android,
Google apps, and GMS free of charge enables Google to attract consumers,
develop competitive products, and increase profits through mobile
advertising. If Google cannot recover its investments in Android and mobile
apps, then it will no longer be able to provide the open-source platform that
enables competitors to develop Android forks in the first instance. The
result: “less innovation, less choice, less competition, and higher prices.”196
Unfortunately, the cost of the Commission’s case will not fall on the
manufacturers, but rather, the end consumers.197
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
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See Walker, supra note 1; see also Sidak, supra note 68, at 65859.
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Sidak, supra note 68, at 658.
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Walker, supra note 1.
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See Manne, supra note 185 (noting that if the Commission’s case is enforced, Google
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V. CONCLUSION
If the Commission drafts a decision prohibiting Google’s business
practices and that decision is formally adopted, then Google should appeal
the decision to the General Court. The General Court should then proceed
cautiously and analyze Google’s alleged unlawful tying arrangement under
a rule of reason standard to determine whether the anticompetitive effects
outweigh the pro-competitive effects of Google’s practice. Google’s
conduct does not foreclose competition by its very nature.198 Rather, Google
invites and encourages competition by offering its Android OS as an opensource platform. Moreover, Google’s conduct enhances consumer welfare
by lowering prices and promoting innovation, all while preserving consumer
sovereignty. While Google may still bear the ultimate burden of proving the
procompetitive effects of its conduct outweigh the anticompetitive effects,
the General Court should refrain from blindly following the Commission’s
findings. The fact that Google offers all its products free of charge combined
with the fact that end consumers can easily uninstall any of Google’s mobile
apps, clearly distinguishes Google’s conduct from Microsoft’s unlawful
bundling practice. An E.U. court presented with the Commission’s case
against Google should not feel restrained by current antitrust jurisprudence
because the unique circumstances certainly “warrant a closer examination of
the effects that tying has on competition.”199
Look down at your phone. Unlock the home screen. Now imagine
Google Search, Chrome Browser, and the Play Store no longer appear.
Instead, your phone manufacturer insists you download these apps for a fee.
Are you satisfied?

will have to charge licensing fees to pre-install apps, and the costs will ultimately be passed
on to end consumers in the form of higher mobile device prices).
198
See generally Dirk Auer, Appropriability and the European Commission’s Android
Investigation (Univ. of Liége Sch. L., Competition and Innovation Inst., Working Paper,
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2767452.
199
Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, [2004], O.J. L 32/33, ¶ 841.

